Privacy is a major concern in designing any cryptographic primitive when frequent transactions are done electronically. During electronic transactions, people reveal their personal data into several servers and believe that this information does not leak too much about them. The adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) takes measure against such privacy issues. The existing AOT-HAP involves a sender and multiple receivers apart from a designated issuer. Security of these schemes rely on the fact that the issuer cannot collude with a set of receivers. Moreover, they loose security when run with multiple protocol instances during concurrent execution. We present the first issuer-free AOT-HAP in universal composable (UC) framework in which the protocol is secure even when composed with each other or with other protocols. A concrete security analysis is given assuming the hardness of q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear (DLIN) and decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problems against malicious adversary in UC model. Moreover, the protocol outperforms the existing similar schemes.
Introduction
To protect sensitive data, it is required to associate some access policies to the data so that receivers who have the necessary permissions can access it. Receiver should possess attribute sets in order to retrieve the data. Upon controlling access to the sensitive data, the associated access policy leaks too much information. For instance, consider a scenario of a medical database consisting of patients records. The access policy associated with each patient's record includes patient's identity, names of treating doctors, names of diseases, medicines recommended, treatments done etc. If access policies are public, then they reveal about the patient's personal information. Many patients do not want to disclose their identities when they undergo a plastic surgical operation, a psychiatric treatment etc. Sometimes, even doctors want to remain anonymous while treating a famous person. The solution to such privacy problems is adaptive oblivious transfer realizing hidden access policy (AOT-HAP).
The AOT-HAP involves a sender, multiple receivers and an issuer. The sender carries a database with N messages and generates a ciphertext database. The access policies are embedded in ciphertexts and are kept veiled. Only those receivers who have the necessary attributes can decipher the ciphertext using secret key issued by the issuer corresponding to its attribute set. A receiver decode the message correctly if his attribute set satisfies the access structure embedded in the ciphertext. Otherwise, a wrong message is retrieved by the receiver. In an adaptive k-out-of-N oblivious transfer, each receiver can recover only k messages and remains oblivious to other N − k messages. The term adaptive means, a receiver recovers one message in each of k transactions. The AOT-HAP consists of three phases -initialization, issue and transfer. The ciphertext database is generated at initialization phase. In issue phase, the secret key is generated corresponding to a receiver's attribute set. Using secret key, a receiver contacts with the sender to decode the ciphertext in transfer phase. Initialization phase is executed once at the outset of the protocol. Issue phase is also executed once between the issuer and a receiver. On the other hand, transfer phase is run k times between a receiver and the sender.
Rabin [28] introduced the first oblivious transfer which was subsequently followed by Brassard et al. [6] and Even et al. [16] to construct secure protocols for multiparty computation. Tauman [21] proposed an efficient contruction of oblivious transfer protocol using projective hash framework of Cramer and Shoup [14] . Naor and Pinkas [25] generalized the concept of Tauman. A wide variety of oblivious transfer protocols are available in the literature [1, 3, 7, 15, 22, 23, 27, 29] .
The first AOT was introduced by Naor and Pinkas [24] consequently followed by [11] , [17] . Aforementioned AOT do not restrict the receivers to access the content of the database. Coull et al. [13] presented the first AOT with access policy which was subsequently generalized by Camenisch et al. [9] and Zhang et al. [31] . Recently, Guleria and Dutta [20] presented the first issuer-free AOT with access policy in universal composable (UC) framework. However, the access policies are public in [9] , [13] , [20] and [31] . To overcome this, Camenisch et al, [8] , [10] and Guleria and Dutta [19] introduced AOT-HAP which are the only oblivious transfer protocols with hidden access policies. The security framework adapted in [24] is half-simulation model while that in [11] , [17] , [13] , [9] , [31] , [8] , [10] and [19] is full-simulation model. In the half-simulation model, the security of one party is examined by comparing the output of the real world against the turnout of the ideal world, while the security of the other party is examined by an argument. The full-simulation model addresses the security of the sender and a receiver in real/ideal world paradigm. None of these models support concurrent execution. Abe et al. [2] proposed the first UC secure AOT with access policy. The UC secure framework follows real/ideal world paradigm and also remains secure even when composed with each other or with the instances of other protocols.
Our Contribution. The aforesaid AOT-HAP protocols do not consider collusion of an issuer with a collection of receivers. If the issuer colludes with any receiver, the receiver can decipher the ciphertext database by getting private keys for all the attributes in the universe of attributes, hence, making these protocols insecure. Besides, the existing AOT-HAP protocols [8] , [10] , [19] are secure in full-simulation model which are vulnerable to practical attacks against concurrent execution. Designs without such constraints are more desirable in practice from both security and efficiency point of view. In this paper, we concentrate on designing AOT-HAP by eliminating these limitations. Our contribution in this paper is-
• firstly to contruct an issuer-free AOT-HAP,
• secondly to prove security in UC framework so that it does not loose security when com-posed with each other or with other protocols.
Our issuer-free k-out-of-N AOT-HAP is executed between a sender and multiple receivers. We combine Boneh-Boyen (BB) [4] signature and Nishide et al. [26] ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE). Groth-Sahai proofs [18] are employed for non-interactive verification of pairing product equations. The sender holds a database of N messages, and each receiver carries some attributes. Each message is associated with an access policy. The sender generates ciphertext database in initialization phase by encrypting each message using CP-ABE under its access policy. The ciphertext database is made public, but the access policies are kept hidden. Subsequently, the protocol makes a motion to issue phase, in which a receiver interacts with the sender to get private key corresponding to its attribute set without leaking any information about its attributes to the sender. Finally, the receiver invokes transfer phase to recover the message. The receiver can retrieve at most k messages, one in each transfer phase in our k-out-of-N AOT-HAP.
The security of our AOT-HAP is analyzed in UC framework in static corruption model in which, the adversary pre-decides which party to corrupt at the beginning of the protocol. This allows security against individual malicious receiver as well as malicious sender. The malicious adversary do not follow the protocol specifications and its malicious behaviour is controlled by providing non-interactive zero-knowledge [18] proofs. We use Groth-Sahai non-interactive witness indistinguishability (NIWI) and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs to detect the malicious activities of a receiver and the sender, respectively. The proposed AOT-HAP provides the following security guarantees -
• the sender does not know who queries a message, which message is being queried and what is the access policy of the message, • the receiver learns one message per query, • the receiver recovers the message correctly if its attribute set qualifies the access policy associated with the message, • the receiver does not learn anything about the access policy of the message.
The proposed AOT-HAP is UC secure assuming q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear (DLIN) and decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions in the presence of malicious adversary.
We compare the proposed AOT-HAP with the existing similar schemes, [8] , [10] and [19] , which are the only schemes available in literature. The AOT-HAP [8] , [10] and [19] assume an issuer and are secure in full-simulation model. The AOT scheme of [2] is secure in UC framework. However, it invokes an issuer and access policies are public. In contrast, our proposed AOT-HAP relaxing the need of an issuer and is secure in UC framework. In [2] , [8] , [10] and [19] , an issuer is included to certify whether each of the receiver possesses the claimed attributes. In such protocols, when a receiver sends an attribute to the ideal functionality, the functionality passes the attribute and receiver identity to the issuer. The issuer informs the functionality whether the attribute should be rejected or accepted. In our protocol, when a receiver sends an attribute to the ideal functionality, the functionality passes the randomized attribute to the sender. The sender checks whether the randomized attribute satisfies the associated pairing product equation. If yes, the sender tells the functionality that the attribute should be accepted, otherwise, rejected. The access policies associated with the messages are completely hidden. The encryption of the messages is such that only those receivers whose attribute set satisfies the access policy attached with messages could recover a correct message otherwise a random message is recovered.
Preliminaries
Notations: Throughout, ρ is taken as the security parameter, x $ ← − A is a random element sampled from the set A, y ← B indicates algorithm B outputs y, X c ≈ Y denotes X and Y are indistinguishable computationally and N denotes natural numbers.
Definition 2.1. (Bilinear Pairing) The map e :
where G 1 , G 2 and G T are three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively.
, then e is asymmetric bilinear pairing. Otherwise, e is symmetric bilinear pairing.
and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ. 
BilinearSetup:
The BilinearSetup on input ρ outputs params = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g 2 ), where e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is an asymmetric bilinear pairing, g 1 generates a group G 1 , g 2 generates a group G 2 and p, the order of the groups G 1 , G 2 and G T , is prime, i.e params ← BilinearSetup(1 ρ ).
Non-Interactive Verification of Pairing Product Equation [18]
A prover and a verifier runs the Groth-Sahai proofs for non-interactive verification of a pairing product equation
where a q ∈ G 1 , b q ∈ G 2 , α q,i , β q,i ∈ Z p and t T ∈ G T , the coefficients of the pairing product equation 2.1 are given to the verifier, q = 1, 2, . . . , Q, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The prover knows the secret values (also called witnesses) x i=1,2,...,n ∈ G 1 , y i=1,2,...,n ∈ G 2 that satisfy the equation 2.1. The prover proves in a non-interactive way that he knows x i and y i without giving any knowledge about secret values to the verifier. Let W = {x i=1,2,...,n , y i=1,2,...,n } denotes the set of all secret values equation 2.1. The set W is called witnesses.
For non-interactive verification of the pairing product equation 2.1, a common reference string GS is generated upon input a security parameter ρ as follows. Let params = (p,
T are three efficiently computable embeddings such that µ 1 (g 1 ) = (1, 1, g 1 ), µ 2 (g 2 ) =
(1, 1, g 2 ), and
T written in matrix form for convenience. Two elements of G 9 T are multiplied component wise. The common reference string GS = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) is made public to the prover and the verifier. The commitments of x i=1,2,...,n and y i=1,2,...,n are generated using GS by the prover. To commit x i ∈ G 1 and y i ∈ G 2 , the prover takes r 1i , r 2i , r 3i
where Com(
The following proof components are generated by the prover
using random values r ji , s ji , which were used for generating commitments to x i , y i , and gives
to the verifier, where
The verifier computes
where
The equations 2.2 and 2.1 holds simultaneously. For a linear equation in which y i are secrets, the verifier verifies the following equation
If x i are secrets, the verifier has to verify the following equation
Theorem 2.5.
[18] The common reference strings in perfectly sound setting and witness indistinguishability setting under DLIN assumption are computationally indistinguishable .
Definition 2.6. (NIWI) The advantage
of non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof is negligible in ρ under DLIN assumption, where GS denotes perfectly sound setting's common reference string, S is a pairing product equation, W 0 , W 1 denote two different set of witnesses satisfying equation S, π denotes proof for equation S and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Definition 2.7. (NIZK) The advantage
of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof is negligible in ρ under DLIN assumption, where GS ′ denotes witness indistinguishability setting's common reference string, S is a pairing product equation, W denotes witnesses satisfying pairing equation S, π 0 denotes proof for equation S, π 1 denotes simulated proof for equation S and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Theorem 2.8. [18] Under DLIN assumption, the Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIWI and NIZK for satisfiability of a set of pairing product equation under a bilinear group .
Access Structure for Ciphertext [26]
Let n be the total number of attributes, and the attributes are indexed as
. . , L n ] is used to denote attribute list or attribute set for a receiver R, where L ℓ ∈ S ℓ . Each receiver has exactly one attribute value from each S ℓ , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The notation W = [W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W n ] is used to specify the access policy associated with a message, where
For instance, let n = 3 and m ′ be a message with access policy
3 Security Model
Syntactic of AOT-HAP
The adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) is a tuple of PPT algorithms and interactive protocols, AOT-HAP = (CRSSetup, DBSetup, Issue, Transfer) between a sender and multiple receivers.
-CrsSetup: This randomized algorithm generates common reference string crs which is made public for everyone.
-DBsetup: This randomized algorithm is run by the sender S who holds a database DB = {m i , W i } 1≤i≤N of N messages. Each message m i is associated with access policy
. . , n. The algorithm generates public/secret key pair (pk, sk), encrypts each m i under access policy W i and generates ciphertext φ i . The access policy W i is embedded implicitly in φ i . The algorithm outputs (pk, sk, ψ, cDB) to S. The proof ψ guarantees that (pk, sk) is a valid public/secret key pair. The sender S publishes public key pk, proof ψ and cihertext database cDB = {φ i } 1≤i≤N to all the receivers. The secret key sk and access policies {W i } 1≤i≤N are kept hidden.
engages in
Issue protocol with S to get attribute secret key ASK from S, where ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. At the end, R gets ASK without leaking any information about its attribute list L to S.
-Transfer Protocol: The receiver R invokes transfer protocol with S to decrypt the ciphertext φ σ j , where σ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. The receiver R recovers the message m σ j if its attribute list L satisfies the access policy W σ j associated with m σ j , otherwise, R gets some random message.
UC Framework
The universal composable (UC) framework was presented by Canetti [12] is adapted in this paper. It includes two worlds-(i) real world and (ii) ideal world. The members involved in real world are M receivers R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R M , a sender S, an adversary A and an environment machine Z. The environment machine Z starts the protocol execution Π by giving inputs to all the parties. In real protocol execution Π, parties interact with each other and A. Respective outputs are given Z by all the parties. Finally, Z outputs a bit, which is output of real world. Ideal world includes an additional incorruptible trusted party F N ×1
AOT-HAP , called an ideal functionality. In ideal world, parties are dummy parties, S, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R M . Dummy parties do not communicate with each other. Activated dummy party just forwards its input to F N ×1 AOT-HAP which is instructed to do the computation work. The ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP gives outputs to the dummy parties. At the end, Z outputs a bit, which is output of ideal world. Now, a protocol Π is said to be securely realizes an ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP if Z is unable to distinguish its interaction with non-negligible probability between a real world adversary A and parties S, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R M running the protocol Π in the real world A and an ideal world adversary A ′ and F N ×1
AOT-HAP , interacting with S, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R M , in the ideal world. As ideal functionalities can be UC-realized only in the presence of some trusted setup. One common form of setup is common reference string (CRS). Let us describe the F D CRS -hybrid model [12] that UC realizes a protocol parameterized by some specific distribution D. Upon receiving a message (CRS), from any party, F D CRS first checks if there is a recorded value crs. If not, F D CRS generates crs ← D(1 ρ ) and records it. Finally, F D CRS sends crs to the party and the adversary. In the proposed construction, the distribution D is CrsSetup algorithm, i.e, crs ← CrsSetup(1 ρ ). The algorithm outputs crs and is made public. Let us briefly discuss how the parties interacts in the real world and in the ideal world. We discuss an interaction between the sender S and a receiver R.
Real World: Upon receiving messages (initdb, DB = {m i , W i } 1≤i≤N ), (issue, L) and (transfer, σ j ) from Z, how S and R behave are briefly discussed below, where j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
• The sender S upon receiving a message (initdb, DB = {m i , W i } 1≤i≤N ) runs DBSetup algorithm with input crs and DB. In DB = {m i , W i } 1≤i≤N , each m i is associated with access policy W i . The algorithm outputs public/secret key pair (pk, sk), a proof ψ which shows the validity of public/secret key pair and ciphertext database cDB = {φ i } 1≤i≤N . The access policy W i is embedded implicitly in φ i . The sender S publishes pk, ψ, cDB to all parties and keeps sk, {W i } 1≤i≤N secret to itself.
• The receiver R upon receiving a message (issue, L) from Z engages in Issue protocol with S. The receiver R first randomizes its attribute set L and generates randomized attributes set L ′ . The sender S upon receiving L ′ from R, generates randomized attribute secret key ASK ′ and gives ASK ′ to R. The receiver R extracts ASK from ASK ′ using random values which were used to randomize the set L.
• Upon receiving a message (transfer, σ j ) from Z, R invokes Transfer protocol. The receiver R takes ciphertext φ σ j from cDB and generates Req σ j , Pri σ j , π σ j . The request Req σ j is the randomization of φ σ j and is given to S. The proof π σ j convinces S that R is decrypting a valid ciphertext φ σ j ∈ cDB. The receiver R gives Req σ j , π σ j to S and keeps Pri σ j secret to itself. The sender S generates response Res σ j using secret key sk. The response Res σ j and proof δ σ j is given to R by S. The proof δ σ j convinces R that S has used the same secret key sk which was used in generating cDB. Using Res σ j , R correctly decrypts φ σ j and recovers m σ j if R's attribute set L implicitly satisfies W σ j . Otherwise, R obtains a random message.
Ideal World: Upon receiving messages (initdb, DB = {m i , W i } 1≤i≤N ), (issue, L) and (transfer, σ j ) from Z, the dummy parties forward them to the ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP . The ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP keeps an empty database DB and an empty attribute set L R for each receiver R. Let us briefly discuss the actions of F N ×1
AOT-HAP .
• Upon receiving message (initdb,
• The ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP upon receiving message (issue, L) from R, sends (issue) to S and receives a bit b ∈ {0, 1} in return from S.
AOT-HAP does nothing.
• Upon receiving message (transfer, σ j ) from R, AOT-HAP sends a null string ⊥ to R.
Protocol
Our AOT-HAP = (CRSSetup, DBSetup, Issue, Transfer) couples Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature [4] and ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) of Nishide et al. [26] . In addition, Groth-Sahai [18] [26] under W i . The access policy W i is embedded implicitly in φ i and is not made public. The BB signature is used to sign the random value which was used to encrypt m i . In Issue phase, the receiver R with the attribute list L interacts with S to get attribute secret key ASK. To decrypt the ciphertext φ σ j , R engages in Transfer protocol with S and extracts m σ j if L |= W σ j , otherwise, R gets a random message. Formal description of CRSSetup, DBSetup, Issue, Transfer are given below. Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n be n attributes and each attribute A ℓ can take n ℓ values, namely, {v ℓ,1 , v ℓ,2 , . . . , v ℓ,n ℓ } as explained in section 2.2, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Algorithm 1 CrsSetup
Input: ρ, n, n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n n . Output: crs.
1: Generate Assparams ← AssBilinearSetup(1 ρ ); 2: for (ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , n) do 3: for (t = 0, 1, . . . , n ℓ ) do
4:
Choose a ℓ,t
);
1 , g
2 , g
-CrsSetup(1 ρ ). The algorithm generates common reference string crs on input security parameter ρ, number of attributes n, number of values n ℓ that each attribute A ℓ can take. The algorithm generates bilinear pairing groups by invoking algorithm BilinearSetup given in section 2. For each attribute value v ℓ,t , the algorithm picks a ℓ,t randomly from Z p , sets A ℓ,t = g a ℓ,t 1 , B ℓ,t = g a ℓ,t 2 , for t = 1, 2, . . . , n ℓ , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm generates the Groth-Sahai common reference strings
for R in perfectly sound setting by choosing ξ 1 , ξ 2 , a, b, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , a, b randomly from Z p and setting
). It outputs crs = (params, GS S , GS R , {{A ℓ,t , B ℓ,t } 1≤t≤n ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n ) to all parties.
Algorithm 2 DBSetup
Input:
Set r i = s i,1 + s i,2 + . . . + s i,n ; i , h); 13: for (ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n) do for (t = 1, 2, . . . , n ℓ ) do 16: if (v ℓ,t ∈ W i,ℓ ) then 
21:
. This algorithm is executed by S with input crs, database DB = {(m i , W i )} 1≤i≤N , where m i ∈ G T , W i = [W i,1 , W i,2 , . . . , W i,n ] is the access policy associated with m i , W i,ℓ ⊆ S ℓ as discussed in section 2.2, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm randomly takes w, x, α, β, γ from Z p , computes B = g
Additionally, it computes Com ′ (h) using GS R as in section 2.1. The algorithm sets public key pk = (B, y, Y, H, Com ′ (h)), secret key sk = (x, α, β, γ, w, h, B γ , g w 1 , g w 2 , g α 1 , g α 2 ). The proof
= ( , c , c , c , c );
is the signature on (2) , c
is the CP-ABE of = 1 , . . . , N . The algorithm outputs pk sk, ψ and ciphertext database cDB to . The sender publishes pk, ψ, cDB to all parties and keeps sk hidden. Anyone can verify the correctness of cDB = (
, g ) for each = 1 , . . . , N.
Receiver R(crs, L = [v 1,t1 , v 2,t2 , . . . , v n,tn ]) Sender S(crs, sk)
Issue Protocol crs, L, sk The receiver invokes Issue protocol, given in Figure , to obtain attribute secret key ASK for its attributes list = [ ,t , v ,t , . . . , v n,t ], where ℓ,t , ℓ = 1 , . . . , n as given in section 2.2. To achieve this, randomizes ℓ,t , extracted from crs = (params GS GS {{ ℓ,t , B ℓ,t ), corresponding to each ℓ,t from using random value and generates randomized set as shown in Figure , where = 1 , . . . , n = 1 , . . . , n. The receiver sets proof
, g to convince that is the randomization of . The randomized set and proof is given to . If the proof is valid, uses secret w, α, β from its secret is generated to convince R that S knows secrets g w 2 , g α 2 , h. The proof ψ consists of proof components of equations e(g −1 g 2 ) and commitments of witnesses B γ , g w 1 , g w 2 , h, g α 1 , g α 2 , g ′ generated using GS S as explained in section 2.1. To encrypt m i under W i , random values s i,1 , s i,2 , . . . , s i,n are selected from Z p . The algorithm sets r i = s i,1 + s i,2 + . . . + s i,n and signs r i using Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature [4] as shown in line 10 of Algorithm 2. After that, m i is encrypted using CP-ABE of [26] .
In ciphertext φ i = (c
2 is the signature on r i , c (2) i , c
is the CP-ABE of m i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The algorithm outputs pk, sk, ψ and ciphertext database cDB = {φ i } 1≤i≤N to S. The sender S publishes pk, ψ, cDB = {φ i } 1≤i≤N to all parties and keeps sk hidden. -Issue Protocol(crs, L, sk). The receiver R invokes Issue protocol, given in Figure 1 , to obtain attribute secret key ASK for its attributes list L = [v 1,t 1 , v 2,t 2 , . . . , v n,tn ], where v ℓ,t ℓ ∈ S ℓ , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n as given in section 2.2. To achieve this, R randomizes B ℓ,t ℓ , extracted from crs = (params, GS S , GS R , {{A ℓ,t , B ℓ,t } 1≤t≤n ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n ), corresponding to each v ℓ,t ℓ from L using random value z ℓ and generates randomized set L ′ as shown in Figure 1 , where t ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n ℓ ,
Correctness of cDB: Anyone can verify the correctness of cDB
is generated to guarantee that has used the same secrets h, γ which were used in initialization phase to set ciphertext database cDB. Upon receiving Res , δ first verifies . If fails, outputs a null string . Otherwise, sets
,ℓ,t if ℓ,t for = 1 , . . . , n and computes
Receiver R(crs, ASK, σ j , φ σj , pk) Sender S(crs, sk) 
The randomized set L ′ and proof ϕ is given to S. If the proof ϕ is valid, S uses secret w, α, β from its secret
2 , where s, λ ℓ are random values from Z p , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The randomized attribute secret key
is given to R. The receiver R extracts ASK from ASK ′ using random values z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n which were used by R to randomize L and checks the correctness of ASK by verifying the equation
-Transfer Protocol(crs, ASK, pk, sk, σ j , φ σ j ). The receiver R engages in Transfer protocol with S to decrypt the ciphertext φ σ j = (c
σ j ) as shown in Figure 2 . For this, R randomizes c (2) σ j = B rσ j using random value v σ j from Z p and generates request Req σ j = c σ j ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) in π σ j guarantees S that φ σ j is a valid ciphertext, i.e, φ σ j ∈ cDB, and 2nd equation shows that Req σ j is the randomization of c (2) σ j . The receiver also raises power v σ j to Com ′ (h) which was given by S in initialization phase generated using GS R . This extra component does not give any advantage to adversary and is useful only for simulator during security analysis. The sender S checks the validity of π σ j . If invalid, S outputs a null string ⊥.
Otherwise, S uses secret h, γ from secret key sk = (x, α, β, γ, w, h, B γ , g w 1 , g w 2 , g α 1 , g α 2 ) to compute response Res σ j = e(Req σ j , h). The proof g 2 )} is generated to guarantee R that S has used the same secrets h, γ which were used in initialization phase to set ciphertext database cDB. Upon receiving Res σ j , δ σ j , R first verifies δ σ j . If fails, R outputs a null string ⊥. Otherwise, R sets c 1, 2, . . . , n and computes
Correctness of equation 4.1.
where c AOT-HAP in the F D CRS -hybrid model described in section 3 under DLIN, DBDH and q-SDH assumptions.
Proof. The AOT-HAP is run between a sender S and multiple receivers. We simulate an interaction between S and a receiver R with an attribute list
n is the total number of attributes, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, (see section 2.2 for detail definition of L ℓ , S ℓ ). The adversarial model adapted in this paper is static corruption model in which adversary decides which party to corrupt before the protocol starts. The corrupted parties remain corrupt, and honest parties remain honest throughout. Therefore, the case of malicious sender and malicious receiver are addressed separately. In both cases, an ideal world adversary A ′ corresponding to a real world adversary A is constructed such that no environment machine or distinguisher Z can distinguish with non-negligible probability, its interactions with A and parties running the protocol Π in the real world from its interaction with A ′ and ideal functionality F N ×1
AOT-HAP in the ideal world. The protocol Π is said to be secure if the real world is as secure as the ideal world. Since the ideal world consists of incorruptible trusted parties, it is impossible for an adversary to attack the ideal world. Therefore, all adversarial attack must fail in real world too. Technically, for each case we show IDEAL F The security proof is presented using sequence of hybrid games. Let Pr[Game i] be the probability that Z distinguishes the transcript of Game i from the real execution.
(a) Security Against Malicious Receiver R. In this case, the real world adversary A corrupts the receiver R before the execution of the protocol. The ideal world adversary A ′ simulates the honest sender S by invoking a copy of A as follows.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the real world protocol interaction in which the receiver interacts with the honest sender S. So, Pr[Game 0] = 0.
Game 1: This game is the same as Game 0 except that A ′ simulates crs. The adversary A ′ simulates crs = (params, GS S , GS R , {{A ℓ,t , B ℓ,t } 1≤t≤n ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n ) exactly as in the above game except that GS S is in witness indistinguishability setting as explained below. The adversary
are generated exactly as in Game 0. To generate GS S in witness indistinguishability setting and GS R in perfectly sound setting, the algorithm chooses ξ 1 , ξ 2 , a, b, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , a, b
The adversary A ′ distributes crs = (params, GS S , GS R , {{A ℓ,t , B ℓ,t } 1≤t≤n ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n ) to all parties and keeps t sim , t ext , {{a ℓ,t } 1≤t≤n ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n hidden.
The common reference string crs simulated by A ′ and crs generated by CrsSetup in actual protocol run are computationally indistinguishable by Theorem 2.5 in section 2.1. Therefore, there exists a negligible function ǫ 1 (ρ) such that |Pr[
Game 2: This game is exactly the same as Game 1 except that A ′ extracts attribute list
T ℓ , g 2 )} was constructed by A which consists of commitments to {A ℓ,t ℓ , T ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n and proof components of pairing equation e(g 1 ,
3 ) extracted from crs, simulated by A ′ in Game 1. The adversary A ′ uses trapdoor t ext = ( a, b, ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) to extract {A ℓ,t ℓ , T ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n from their respective commitments as explained below.
), where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 are random values from Z p which were used to generate
Similarly, A ′ extracts all the witnesses {A ℓ,t ℓ , T ℓ } 1≤ℓ≤n . Let L be the set of attribute values which is initially empty. The adversary A ′ checks whether A ζ,ς = A ℓ,t ℓ for ς = 1 to n ζ , ζ = 1 to Game 3: This game is exactly the same as Game 2 except that A ′ extracts the index σ j from the proof π σ j = NIWI GS R {(c
2 )} by extracting witnesses wit 1 = c
σ j using t ext exactly as A ′ has extracted A ℓ,t ℓ in Game 2. The adversary A ′ checks whether c AOT-HAP . The ideal functionality returns m σ j to A ′ if L satisfies the access policy W σ j associated with m σ j , otherwise, ⊥ is given to A ′ . If no matching index σ j found and the proof π σ j is correct, then this means that σ j / ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } and π σ j is constructed by A for the ciphertext
σ j ). Eventually, this shows that A is able to construct a valid BB signature c (1) σ j , thereby A outputs c (1) σ j as a forgery contradicting the fact that the BB signature is unforgeable assuming q-SDH problem is hard [4] . Therefore, there exists a negligible function
Game 4: This game is the same as Game 3 except that the response Res σ j and proof δ σ j are simulated by A ′ , for each transfer phase j = 1, 2, . . . , k. To simulate response Res ′ σ j , A ′ first extracts h vσ j from its commitment (Com ′ (h)) vσ j using t ext as done in Game 2. The commitment to h vσ j is generated by A by raising power v σ j to the commitment of h given by S in initialization phase as
where L = [v 1,t 1 , v 2,t 2 , . . . , v n,tn ] and m σ j are extracted in Game 2 and Game 3, respectively. The proof
To simulate the proof δ σ j , A ′ sets a 1,σ j = a 2,σ j = a 3,σ j = a 4,σ j = g 0 2 and generate commitment to all these values. As A ′ knows the simulation trapdoor t sim , it can open the commitment to any value of its choice as explained in Example ?? in section 2.1. The adversary A ′ opens commitment of a 3,σ j to g 0 2 in first and 2nd equation of δ σ j and to g 1 2 in 3rd equation of of δ σ j . Thus, all the equations in δ σ j are simulated by A ′ . Claim 1. Under the DLIN assumption, the response Res σ j and the proof δ σ j honestly generated by the sender S are computationally indistinguishable from the response Res 
and, the honestly generated response Res σ j is
The simulated response Res ′ σ j is distributed identically to honestly generated response Res σ j . As Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIZK by Theorem 2.8, the simulated proof δ ′ σ j is computationally indistinguishable from the honestly generated proof δ σ j . Therefore, we have |Pr[Game 4] − Pr[Game 3]| ≤ ǫ 4 (ρ), where ǫ 4 (ρ) is a negligible function.
Game 5: This game is the same as Game 4 except that A ′ replaces perfect database DB = {(m i , W i )} 1≤i≤N by a random database DB ′ = {( m i , W i )} 1≤i≤N . The adversary A ′ generates (pk ′ , ψ ′ , cDB ′ ), computes response Res σ j , proof δ σ j . But, in this game the response Res σ j is computed on an invalid statement. The proof ψ ′ is simulated exactly in the same way as A ′ simulates δ σ j in Game 4. In Game 4, cDB is the encryption of perfect database DB whereas in Game 5, cDB ′ is the encryption of random database DB ′ . If the distinguisher Z can distinguish between the transcript of Game 5 from the transcript of Game 4, we can construct a solver for DLIN and DBDH using Z as a subroutine -a contradiction as CP-ABE of [26] is semantically secure assuming the hardness of DLIN and DBDH problems. Therefore, Game 4 and 
Comparison
We compare our proposed issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) with [2] , [8] , [10] , [19] . The subtle differences between our scheme and [2] , [8] , [10] , [19] are listed below.
1. The schemes of [8] , [10] and [19] , to the best of our knowledge, are the only existing AOT-HAP, but they are not secure in UC framework.
2. Abe et al. [2] introduced the first adaptive oblivious transfer with access policy in UC framework, but access policies are not hidden.
3. Guleria and Dutta [20] presented the concept of issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer with public access policies.
4. The schemes [2] , [8] , [10] , [19] assume an issuer apart from a sender and multiple receivers in their constructions and are secure under the restriction that the issuer never colludes with a set of receivers. Table 1 Comparison Summary of computation cost in k transfer phases and initialization phase (PO stands for number of pairing operations, EXP for number of exponentiation operations, CRSG for crs generation, and AP for access control, n is the number of attributes, m is total number of values which n attributes can take, N is the database size).
In contrast to [2] , [8] , [10] , [19] , we introduce the first issuer-free AOT-HAP in UC framwork. Our AOT-HAP is issuer-free, realizes hidden access policy and achieves UC security. Table 1 provides the computation cost involved in k Transfer phases, in algorithms DBSetup and CRSSetup. In addition, issue phase takes 20n + 8 exponentiations and 2n + 15 pairing. Table 2 Comparison summary of communication cost in k transfer phases and initialization phase (cDB stands for ciphertext database, pk for public key, n is the number of attributes, m is total number of values which n attributes can take, N is the database size, SXDH -symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption, XDLIN -external decision Linear assumption, q-SDH -q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, DBDH-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, DBDHE-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption, DLIN-decision Linear assumption).
assumption. As illustrated in Table 1 and 2, our protocol is more efficient as compared to the only existing UC secure adaptive oblivious without hidden access policy.
Conclusion
We have proposed the first issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) in universal composable (UC) framework. In issuer-free AOT-HAP, the sender publishes the ciphertext database encrypted under associated access policies. The receiver interacts with the sender in order to decrypt the messages of its choice without revealing its identity, attribute set and choice of messages. The receiver either recovers the correct message or a garbage one depending upon whether the receiver's attribute set satisfies the access policy associated with the message. The proposed AOT-HAP has been proved UC secure under the hardness of q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear (DLIN) and decision bilinear DiffieHellman (DBDH) problems in the presence of malicious adversary. Moreover, the protocol is efficient as compared to the existing similar schemes.
